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Large Market Games, the Law of One Price, and Market
Structure∗
Waseem A. Toraubally†
Lancaster University, Bailrigg, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK.
Abstract
This paper introduces a new class of market games featuring multiple posts per commodity,
in which trading posts are privately owned. It is demonstrated via three robust counterex-
amples, that in this setting the law of one price fails, thus showing, contrary to longstanding
belief in the literature, that price dispersion in large market games is extremely robust. Most
importantly, it is established that even in economies with a continuum of small agents and
innitely many atoms (all of whom can arbitrage prices if they so wish), and an innite num-
ber of markets per commodity, the set of equilibriaand the resulting market structureis
inuenced, both by strategic behaviour, and private ownership of posts.
JEL Classication: D49, D51, C72.
Keywords: Large Economies; Arbitrage Equilibria; Law of One Price.
1 Introduction
The inuence of strategic considerations on the process of price formation is a fundamental issue,
and one elegant theory capturing both these concepts is that of strategic market games (SMG).
An SMG, originating in DubeyShubik (1978), ShapleyShubik (1977), and Shubik (1973), is a
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Omer Edhan, whose guidance is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to the Editor and to two anonymous
referees for their careful reading of my manuscript, and their many insightful comments and suggestions. I have
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ted from discussions with P. Hammond, F. Nava, H. Polemarchakis, C. Reggiani, A. Villamil, and N.
Yannelis. My thanks are extended to all of the above individuals. Any errors are my responsibility.
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noncooperative trading model in which commodity prices depend on the buy-and-sell decisions of
agents. Such strategic decision making by agents has called into question the validity of the law of
one price1 (LOP) in SMG with multiple trading posts per commodity (MTPC). An important
implication of the failure of the LOP is that the set of equilibria depends nontrivially on the
structure of trading posts. Regarding the latter, it is interesting to note that in standard SMG
models, trading posts are typically assumed to be publicly and costlessly available. Surprisingly,
the question never seems to have been asked if (or how) the privatisation of trading posts would
aect the equilibrium allocations and prices in a meaningful manner. The purpose of this paper is
to demonstrate that private ownership of trading posts,2 alongside strategic behaviour by agents,
in MTPC market games is indeed a material issue.
The following fact is established: even in very large economies, strategic considerations still
matter in the determination of the equilibrium market structure. We achieve this by proving, in a
new class of MTPC market games, that the LOP, an intimate feature of Walrasian markets, fails
to obtain in very general settings. Hence, trading posts cannot be consolidated.3 This is in stark
contrast to the norm in SMG, where provided there are at least countably innitely many agents
(large and/or small), the LOP always prevails. Indeed, Koutsougeras (1999; 2003a; 2003b) shows
the failure of the LOP when the number of agents is nite. Koutsougeras (2003a) then proves that
as the number of agents increases without bounds in MTPC models with publicly-available posts,
the uniformity of prices across trading posts is restored, independently of the characteristics
preferences, endowments, measure, etc.of agents.4 In our model, however, the failure of the
LOP to obtain eectively stems from the heterogeneity of agents. There are two types of agents
1The LOP postulates that at equilibrium, there is a single price that clears all markets for a commodity. It is a
central feature of Walrasian economies, in which markets for a commodity are consolidated and modeled as a single
trading spot where transactions take place. See Koutsougeras (1999; 2003b) for numerical examples in which the
LOP fails in SMG with nitely many agents, all of whom face no binding liquidity constraints.
2It must be noted that in the model that we propose, post owners are not given any kind of extreme market
power. More precisely, they can neither close down their post, nor preclude agents from trading at their spots,
such that all agents are perfectly free to choose where to trade, and to arbitrage prices should they so wish.
3The equilibrium market/trading-post structure is determined by the distribution of prices across posts for each
commodity. Consider any commodity k. If for k the support of this distribution is a single point, then there is
eectively a single trading post for k. However, if equilibrium prices are not uniform across trading posts for k,
then it follows that the equilibrium structure of posts cannot be merged into a single trading platform. So, the
LOPor the failure thereofis a tool that we use to determine the market structure at equilibrium.
4Koutsougeras' (2003a) limit economy need not be atomlesseven if there exist nitely many non-price-taking
atoms in the limit, the LOP must still hold. Thus, note that that limit economy need not be perfectly competitive;
indeed, the validity of the LOP is a more general issue than the prevalence of perfect competition.
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in this model, pure traders (the only kind of agents that Koutsougeras, 1999; 2003a; 2003b,
considers), and trading post owners. The latter not only buy and sell across posts, but also levy
a proportional service charge on agents who trade at their spots. We show, intriguingly, that
even with a continuum of price takers, and only as few as two, or as many as an innite number
of large players, the LOP is still violated. This persistent price inequality is driven, both by
strategic play by agents, and the trading-post service charge, an intricate concept which looks
deceptively trivial.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing SMG models analyses the existence and
availability of trading posts. Thus far, the SMG literature has been content to assume that trading
posts somehow exist, and are somehow made publicly and costlessly available for all agents to trade
at, as though by some other invisible hand. In this paper, we depart from the literature and
introduce post owners, who in addition to commodities, are endowed with trading posts. These
agents also engage in trade, by presenting arrays of buy-and-sell strategies at their own, and/or
other post owners' posts, as do the pure traders. Now, in mostif not alleconomic models,
privately-owned trading platforms are very rarely provided free of charge, and are even more so
in real-world economies. In this light, we assume that post owners levy a proportional service
charge per unit of (monetary) net trade on all agents who transact at their post.5 Thus, an agent
whose net trade is zero at a postand therefore derives no direct monetary benet from trading
therehas no premium to pay. This service charge is reminiscent of the taxes and transactions
costs that agents pay and incur in Gabszewicz and Grazzini (1999), Koutsougeras and Ziros (2015),
and Rogawski and Shubik (1986). However, dierently to these models, in the current paper, it
is agents who charge agents,6 and solely on their net proceeds, a formulation which is unique to
this SMG. We assume that these trading-post service charges are exogenously given. Think of
some outside agency as selecting and allocating these charges at the outset, before trading starts.7
5In the present model, the focus is on how post owners charge other agents for trading at platforms that they
own. We acknowledge that ideally, setting up a trading post should also be costly. However, since it is assumed
that post owners are endowed with such posts, there is therefore no cost for them to set up a platform, nor can
they decide how many trading posts per commodity they would like to open or shut down.
6Thus, in addition to how their individual bids and oers directly aect their allocations, agents must also
consider how their strategies aect the premia payable that accrue to them. The introduction of this service charge
leads to a modication of agents' strategy sets and holdings-surfaces, such that, as opposed to Koutsougeras (1999),
but similarly to Koutsougeras (2003a; 2003b), the SMG models considered in this paper are generalised games.
7While these charges can be endogenised, in our framework we choose to take these as being given, such that
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Interestingly, this charge is the same across all markets for a commodity, but need not be the
same across dierent commoditiessee more about the potency of this specication below.
We show that non-uniform prices in equilibrium are much more persistent than has been por-
trayed in previous models. Indeed, the LOP fails even in cases where conventional wisdom dictates
it should not, namely, with a continuum of small agents, and innitely many atoms. Perhaps it
would be helpful at this point to spell out what the failure of the LOP is not. An unequal-price
equilibrium in our model does not simply mean dierent market-clearing prices and similar ef-
fective after-service-charge (ASC) prices across posts for a commodity. As previously remarked,
this service charge is equal at all posts for the same commodity. Hence, the failure of the LOP as
postulated in this paper not only means dierent market-clearing prices, but also dierent eective
ASC prices across dierent posts for a commodity. This is a strong result.
The intuition behind the failure of the LOP in every robust counterexample8 considered in
this paper is the same: what to outside observers seems like an arbitrage opportunity, is actually
not for the active market participant. We explain why this is so. The large pure traders and
post owners (who also trade) aect market-clearing prices nontrivially. Hence, whenever they try
to take advantage of the price dierence by altering their bid-and-oer decisions across any two
posts, the resulting net change aects them adversely. Consider the insignicant agents now. By
shifting his orders from one post to another, a negligible individual aects neither the equilibrium
price, nor the equilibrium allocation. Yet, he still cannot prot from the price dierence, due to
the counterbalancing eect that is provided by the trading-post service charge. For clarity, let
us contemplate one such very small agent who shifts all of his bids from the more expensive to
the cheaper markets, and all of his oers from the cheaper to the more expensive posts. In doing
so, he incurs charges on the full amounts of: (i) his bids, and; (ii) his receipts from sales, across
both markets. The net gain obtained by the shift of orders is thus more than completely oset by
the increase in premia payable. So, no insignicant agent has any incentive to deviate, and this
unequal-price situation is indeed sustainable as an equilibrium.
extremely little to almost no market power is given to the post owners. Note also that these charges may instead
be viewed as taxes imposed by a government. This interpretation was suggested to me by Herakles Polemarchakis.
8More precisely, the following is true of all the counterexamples computed in this paper: any endowments, and
utility functions with the same marginal rate of substitution at the consumption allocations as computed in the
respective examples, would constitute equilibria with the same properties (such that the LOP still fails). This fact
attests to the robustness of our counterexamples in endowment and utility spaces.
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In the next section, we construct and show the failure of the LOP in a model with a continuum
of small agents, and nitely many large agents and trading posts. In Section 3, we extend this
model to include innitely many trading posts per commodity. In Section 4, we generalise the
model in Section 3 to include innitely many atoms. Our conclusions are summarised in Section
5. The Appendix contains all the technical proofs.
2 The failure of the LOP, Part 1: The model
In this section, we analyse a model featuring: (i) an atomless continuum of small agents; (ii)
nitely many atoms, and; (iii) nitely many markets per commodity.
We consider a pure exchange economy with small agents, represented by an atomless continuum,
and large agents, represented by atoms. So, we let the set of agents be denoted by N = N0 ∪ A,
where N0 = (0, 1], and A = {2, ..., H}. The collection of all half-open intervals in (0, 1] dened by
S0 = {(a, b] : a, b ∈ N0}, where (a, b] = ∅ if b ≤ a, is a semiring. So, let ν0 be a measure on S0
such that ν0 ((a, b]) = b−a, and denote the Carathéodory extension of ν0 by µ0. Let N0 denote the
collection of all µ0-measurable subsets of N0 (and recall that µ0 is in fact the Lebesgue measure
when restricted to N0). Next, dene the collection of all the subsets of A by SA = P(A), which is
trivially a σ-algebra (and hence, a semiring). Finally, denote by µA the counting measure on SA.
We may now introduce the following properties of our set of agents:
The triple (N,N , µ)where N is the collection of all µ-measurable sets of N , and µ is an
extended real-valued, σ-additive measure dened on Nis a complete, nite measure space of
agents (See Appendix, Lemmata 1 and 2). Let NN0 denote the restriction of N to N0, and NA the




, where NN0 = N0 and µ = µ0 when





where NA = SA and µ = µA when restricted to NA (See Appendix, Lemma 4), is purely atomic.
Moreover, for each i ∈ A, the singleton set {i} is an atom of the measure space (N,N , µ). Thus,
one can describe N0 and A as being the sets of small and large agents, respectively.
We denote the set of commodities bought and sold in this economy by K = {1, 2, ...., L}. There
is also an (L + 1)th commodity, m, which in addition to yielding utility in consumption, acts as
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money. There are two types of agents in this economy, pure traders, and post owners.
Each pure trader h ∈ N is characterised by a preference relation, which is representable by a
utility function uh : RL+1+ → R, and an initial endowment of commodities e(h) ∈ RL+1+ .
Post owners, as opposed to pure traders, are also endowed with trading posts. Each post owner
i ∈ N is characterised by a preference relation representable by a utility function ui : RL+1+ → R,
and initial endowments of commodities e(i) ∈ RL+1+ , and trading posts Υi = {Υi1,Υi2, . . . ,ΥiL}, i.e.,
each i is endowed with only one post for each k ∈ K, where Υik denotes the post for k owned by i.
We impose the following technical condition on post owners: any post owned by a small w ∈
N0 has capacity
9 χsmall = 0, while any post owned by an atom in A has capacity χatom = µ(N).10
Before trading starts, an outside agency allocates a service charge to post owners, which all
agents then take as given when making their trading decisions. This proportional service charge
ck ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ K, is the same across all posts for a good k, but may dier across commodities
i.e., let |P | <∞ denote the total number of (large) post owners, such that c1,k = · · · = c|P |,k = ck,
and c1,l = · · · = c|P |,l = cl for all k, l ∈ K, k 6= l, but ck need not be equal to cl.
Throughout this paper, we will employ the following assumptions:
Assumption (i) e(n) > 0 for each n ∈ N .
Assumption (ii) Preferences for each type of agents are strictly convex, C2, and dierentiably
strictly monotone,11 and indierence surfaces through the endowment do not intersect the axes.
2.1 The strategic market game
Trade in the economy is organised through trading posts, at which agents oer commodities for
sale, and place bids for purchases of commodities. Bids, (b), for commodities 1, . . . , L, are placed in
terms of commodity m, while sales, (q), are made in terms of commodities 1, . . . , L. The strategy
9i.e., the measure of agents that the trading post can accommodate.
10Based on this rule, we may w.l.o.g., view all agents µ-a.e, w ∈ N0, as being (small) pure traders, and view all
post owners and large pure traders as lying in N \ N0 only. While this condition makes the model more elegant
mathematically without any loss of intuition, it is actually also required for the well-denedness of our modelsee,
e.g., Dubey and Shapley (1994: p. 264). We will therefore use this method throughout this paper.
11i.e., if u represents , then for all x ∈ RL+1++ , ∂u/∂xk > 0 ∀k = m, 1, 2, ...L.
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bsk (n)+Λ(n) ≤ em (n) ;
|P |∑
s=1
qsk (n) ≤ ek (n) , k ∈ K
}
,
where ϕsk(n), ϕ = b, q, denotes the strategies of agent n ∈ N at the post owned by s ∈ A for
commodity k, and Λ(n) is the total premium payable12 by n (more on how Λ(n) is calculated is
found below). A strategy prole consists of a pair of measurable mappings b : N → R|P |×L+ and
q : N → R|P |×L+ , such that (b(n), q(n)) ∈ S(n) a.e in N , i.e., a strategy prole is a measurable
choice from the graph of the correspondence S, Gr(S). It is easily seen that S : N ⇒ 2R
2×|P |×L
+ has a
measurable graph, and therefore such mappings exist, by Aumann's Measurable Selection Theorem
(AMST). For a given strategy prole (b, q) ∈ Gr(S), we then dene Bsk =
´
N




qsk(n)dµ < ∞. Transactions at each post clear through the price psk = (Bsk/Qsk). For
k ∈ K, we let zsk(n) = (bsk(n)/psk) − qsk(n) denote the net trade in k of a player n ∈ N by trading













Consumption allocations, xh,k (b(h), q(h), B−h, Q−h) ≡ xh,k, for commodities k = m, 1, . . . , L,


























1 + ts,kh c
k
)
if k = m,
(1)
where ts,kh : R ⊃ zsk(h) → {−1,+1}, ck is the proportional service charge payable (per unit of
monetary net trade) at all trading posts for k, and as is standard in the SMG literature, any division
by zero, including 0/0, is taken to equal zero whenever it appears in the allocation rule above.




k(h)). The second expression in the
allocation rule above incorporates the total premia payable to post owners, in terms of commodity
m. The total premium payable at a post depends on the dierence between an individual h's total
12As mentioned in the introduction, the premium payable at a post Υsk by an agent n depends on his net trade
there. His net trade at that post depends on the price at Υsk, which in turn depends on the strategies of all the
players. Hence, the term Λ(n), and what is feasible depend on the strategies of all the players, such that the market
games considered in Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this paper are generalised games.
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revenue and his bid placed, both at the same post. In this light, we stipulate that ts,kh = +1 if
zsk(h) > 0 (such that q
s
k(h) · psk − bsk(h) < 0), and t
s,k
h = −1 if zsk(h) < 0 (s.t. qsk(h) · psk − bsk(h) > 0).
If zsk(h) = 0, then we use the following rule:
13
ts,kh =




In light of the above, the premium payable at a post Υsk by any agent n ∈ N may be written




s=1 − ckts,kn (qsk(n) · psk − bsk(n)).
Consumption allocations, xi,k (b(i), q(i), B−i, Q−i) ≡ xi,k, for k = m, 1, . . . , L, to any (large)












































1 + ts,ki c
k
)
if k = m.
(2)
The conditions on ts,ki are as for pure traders above. The second expression in the above rule also
includes total premia receivable at posts i owns, and amounts payable (to other post owners).
An equilibrium for this model is dened as a prole of agents' buy-and-sell decisions across
all trading posts and commodities (b, q) ∈ Gr(S) which forms a Nash equilibrium (N.E). At an













b(n), q(n), B−n, Q−n
))}
. (3)
Before we proceed, we dene, for a large post owner i ∈ A, the net proceeds of commodity m,
from trading at his post Υik, by z
i





















13Though it may appear abstract, the use of this rule has an important economic meaning. We use this speci-
cation because for any n ∈ N whose net trade is 0 at a post Υsk, we have that Bs−n,k/Qs−n,k = Bsk/Qsk, a condition
that for every small w ∈ N0, regardless of w's net trade being positive, negative, or zero, is always true. In other
words, if zsk(n) = 0, then agent n behaves like a price taker at post Υ
s
kbut is not one, unless n ∈ N0. We also











· (1 + ti,kn ck).
In the sequel, we will derive properties of interior equilibria14 for our economy where there are
at least two (large) active posts per commodity. A post is active if price is positive and there is
trade. An equilibrium is interior if every agent is solving (3) in the interior of S(n).
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We proceed with two propositions which characterise equilibrium prices for a commodity between
pairs of trading posts. The failure of the LOP is crystallised in Theorem 1.
PROPOSITION 1.1 In an economy with a continuum of agents, and at least two (large) active
posts, at an interior N.E, the prices for any commodity k ∈ K between any such pair of trading
posts Υik,Υ
j
k should satisfy the following (no-arbitrage) conditions:
15
















1 + ti,kτ ck
)(pjk)2;
For µ-a.e, w ∈ N0 : pik =
(
1 + tj,kw c
k
)(
1 + ti,kw ck
) pjk.
PROPOSITION 1.2 In an economy with a continuum of agents, and at least two active posts
owned by (large) agents i, j ∈ A, i 6= j, at an interior N.E, the prices for any commodity k ∈ K
between trading posts Υik,Υ
j









































1 + ti,kj c
k
) (pjk)2 .
THEOREM 1 Consider any commodity k ∈ K. Whenever at equilibrium ∃θ ∈ N , such that
µ(θ ∩N0) > 0, and µ-a.e, w ∈ (θ ∩N0), zαk (w) ≥ 0, z
β
k (w) < 0, α, β ∈ A, then pαk 6= p
β
k .
14Dubey and Shubik (1978) proved the existence of equilibriawhich may fail to be interiorfor the species of
SMG we use. However, in this paper, we construct ad hoc counterexamples, in which non-trivial equilibria do exist.
15Recallsee footnote 10that we may w.l.o.g. view all agents µ-a.e, w ∈ N0, as being (small) pure traders.
Thus, as both conditions below characterise N.E prices for pure traders, they have been presented together.
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A well-founded question is whether the LOP would still fail if the service charge became too small,
or too large. Theorem 1 gives us the possibility to elaborate on this matter. Take any commodity
k ∈ K, and any suciently small ε > 0. If ck = ε, then so long as the conditions in the statement
of the theorem hold, it is clear that the LOP still has to fail. A similar argument would be true if
ck = 1− ε. This is because large agents cannot protably deviate, for their actions aect market-
clearing prices adversely. On the other hand, small agents, who themselves live in a world of
innitesimals, (Dubey and Shapley, 1994: p. 264) are hindered by any positive service charge.
Theorem 1 also shows that as ck decreases (increases), the degree of price dispersion decreases
(increases). So, suppose that ck were very large (close to 1). Would such a high ck not be prohibitive
to trade? It can be easily argued that this need not be the case. Using Theorem 1, we know that a
high ck implies that prices across posts for commodity k must be vastly unequal. Thus, if an agent
were, say, a net buyer at post Υik and a net seller at post Υ
j
k, and had no incentive to shift orders
across these posts, then this must be because: (i) his total expenditure (inclusive of the premium
payable) at Υik is suciently low, and; (ii) his total revenue (net of the premium payable) that he









agent makes high (low) non-zero net trades at both postswhile agents on the other sides of the
corresponding markets make low (high) net trades. This discussion thus shows that a high ck does
not destroy agents' incentives to trade. An analogous argument is true when ck is close to zero.
Yet another piece of information that can be gleaned from Theorem 1 is that at equilibrium,
only two dierent prices may be obtained across posts for any commodity k ∈ K at any time.
2.3 Unequal-price equilibrium: an example
We exemplify the failure of the LOP in a setup with: (i) an atomless continuum of small agents;
(ii) nitely many atoms, and; (iii) nitely many posts per commodity.16
Let (N,N , µ) be a measure space of agents where N = N0 ∪ A = (0, 1] ∪ {2, 3}, and µ is as
16For the economy considered in this subsectionand the economies in the subsequent counterexamples as well
equilibria in which the LOP holds can be trivially constructed, and are available from the author.
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dened in Section 2. For the sake of clarity, we denote agents 2 and 3 by i and j, respectively.
There are two commodities {k, l}, and i and j each own one trading post for each commodity.
Each trading post has capacity χatom = µ(N) = 3. The service charges allocated to the post
































Consider the markets for k. We look for a prole which simultaneously satises the N.E conditions
in Propositions 1.1 (for w ∈ N0), 1.2, and Theorem 1, which the following strategies do:(
bik(w), q
i








2, 2, 5, 9
4
)
































For the above representation of bids and oers in the two markets for commodity k, the prevailing




Consider now the markets for commodity l. It can again be veried that the prole of strategies
below satises Propositions 1.1 (for w ∈ N0), 1.2, and Theorem 1:(
bil(w), q
i








15, 2, 2, 3
)








































For the above representation of bids and oers in the two markets for commodity l, the prevailing
market-clearing prices are pil = 3, and p
j
l = (11/3).
Each agent ends up with consumption (xn,k, xn,l, xn,m) = (2000, 2000, 2000), µ-a.e, n ∈ N .
From here, one can proceed as in Koutsougeras (1999) to easily derive utility functions such that
the above prole of strategies constitutes an N.E. For concreteness, we present one solution:
17We remark that in the class of SMG that we propose in this paper, it is necessary that there be wash-sales for
the LOP to fail, consistent with Bloch and Ferrer's (2001) nding. We also point out that agents µ-a.e, w ∈ N0,
need not be identical. We have done this for simplicity, and to ensure that unnecessary matters do not detract from
the main message of the paper.
11
uw(xw) = 16 ln(xw,k) + 33 ln(xw,l) + 10 ln(xw,m), µ-a.e, w ∈ N0,
ui(xi) = 779424 ln(xi,k) + 769923 ln(xi,l) + 243570 ln(xi,m),
uj(xj) = 117376 ln(xj,k) + 366630 ln(xj,l) + 104800 ln(xj,m).
3 The failure of the LOP, Part 2: The model
We now analyse the failure of the LOP in a context featuring: (i) an atomless continuum of small
agents; (ii) nitely many atoms, and; (iii) innitely many markets per commodity.
We consider a complete, nite measure space of agents (N,N , µ), whereN = N0∪A, N0 = (0, 1],
and A = {2, . . . , H}. µ is Lebesgue when restricted to NN0 , and the counting measure when
restricted to NA, where NN0 and NA are as dened in Section 2. The commodity space is dened
by RL+1, and the consumption set of each agent by RL+1+ . Each (large) post owner now owns
countably innitely many trading posts for each commodity k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . , L}. Now, dene
Y = `1 × `1, where each factor `1, the space of absolutely-summable real sequences, is equipped
with its 1-norm, i.e., is given its usual norm topology. We supply Y with the product topology, and
we equip it with the norm ‖(x, y)‖Y = ‖x‖`1 +‖y‖`1 <∞, (x, y) ∈ Y . Next, consider Θ := `1+× `1+,
where `1+ denotes the positive cone of `
1. The strategy sets of agents can then described by a
measurable correspondence S : N ⇒ 2Θ, such that18
S(n) =
{












qs,rk (n) ≤ ek (n) , k ∈ K
}
,











, and |P | is the number of large post owners
in A. Note that in this section, Υs,rk represents the r
th trading post owned by post owner s ∈ A
for commodity k. As before, posts owned by atoms have capacity χatom = µ(N), while χsmall = 0.
A strategy prole consists of a pair of measurable mappings b : N → `1+, and q : N → `1+, such
that (b(n), q(n)) ∈ S(n) a.e in N . `1+ is a separable Banach (complete normed vector) space. Y ,
equipped with the norm as described above, is also a Banach space, and therefore, so is Θ. Now, it
is well known that the countable Cartesian product of separable spaces is separable, and hence, we
18Since for agents µ-a.e, n ∈ N , ek(n) <∞ ∀k ∈ ({m}∪K), we have that bids and oers must converge for every
individual, hence our choice of sequence space.
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have that the product vector space Θ is a separable Banach space. Considering S : N ⇒ 2Θ has
a measurable graph, we have that the measurable mappings b and q exist, by AMST. A mapping
f : N → X is said to be µ-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple functions {fn}n∈N
such that µ-a.e, limn→∞ ‖fn − f‖X = 0. Seeing that every measurable mapping can be obtained
as the limit of some sequence of simple functions, it follows that b and q are µ-measurable. A
µ-measurable function f : N → X is called Bochner-integrable if there exists a sequence of
simple functions {fn}n∈N such that limn→∞
´
N
‖fn − f‖X dµ = 0. It can equally be shown that




‖f‖X dµ <∞ (see, e.g., Diestel and Uhl, 1977: p. 45). As (N,N , µ) is a nite
measure space, it is easy to see that
´
N
‖b‖`1 dµ <∞ and
´
N
‖q‖`1 dµ <∞, and thus, we have that
b and q are Bochner-integrable. Furthermore, since the µ-measurable mappings b and q take values
in a separable Banach space, they are also weakly measurable, by Pettis' Measurability Theorem










, where bs,rk , q
s,r
k : N× R+ ⊃ N → R+, are also measurable. Hence,









qs,rk (n)dµ < ∞. Transactions at each post clear through


































1 + ts,r,kh c
k
)
if k = m,
(4)


















































1 + ts,r,ki c
k
)
if k = m,
(5)
where as before, any division by zero, including 0/0, is taken to equal zero. The conditions on ts,r,kn
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for each n ∈ N and s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |P |} are as in Section 2. We impose that the total endowment






At an N.E with positive bids and oers, agents are viewed as solving the same programme as in
(3). By Assumption (ii), u(·) is (twice-) continuously dierentiable, and since our commodity space
is still nite-dimensional, we have that u(·) is in fact (twice-) continuously Fréchet-dierentiable19
(in x). As we show in the Appendix, Lemma 6, xh,k and xi,k, as (well-) dened above, are in turn,
Gâteaux-dierentiable19 (in b and q). Hence, we are able to prove that:
PROPOSITION 2 The (no-arbitrage) equilibrium conditions in Propositions 1.1, 1.2 and The-
orem 1 are true for this section as well, mutatis mutandis.20
3.1 Unequal-price equilibrium: an example
We demonstrate the invalidity of the LOP in a framework featuring: (i) an atomless continuum of
small agents; (ii) nitely many atoms; and; (iii) innitely many markets per commodity.
We let (N,N , µ) be a complete, nite measure space as dened in Section 3, where N =
N0 ∪ A = (0, 1] ∪ {2, 3}. As before, we denote agents 2 and 3 by i and j, respectively. There are
two commodities {k, l}, and i and j each own countably innitely many trading posts for each
commodity. The capacity of each trading post is χatom = µ(N) = 3. The service charges allocated




). The commodity endowments of the
agents are as follows:
k l m




), µ-a.e, w ∈ N0,










































of degree zero in bids and oers, a fact which will be used throughout this example.
19Please refer to Luenberger (1969: pp. 171-172) for a formal denition.
20`1+ has an empty interior. Thus, in the statements of these results, the equilibria must be recharacterised,
instead of interior, as N.E with positive bids and oers, and no binding liquidity and oer constraints.
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In particular, using the above fact, we may easily reformulate the strategy prole in Section
2.3 to let i and j both own countably innitely many markets for each commodity, by simply
replicating posts as we next show. So rst, we relabel the posts owned by i for commodity k as{
Υi,1k ,Υ
i,2












. It can then be veried,
for any pair of trading posts Υi,αk ,Υ
j,β
k , α, β ∈ N, that the following strategies satisfy Propositions
1.1, 1.2 and Theorem 1, mutatis mutandis, thus constituting an (unequal-price) N.E:
For commodity k, at posts Υi,rk and Υ
j,r
k , r ∈ N:
Bids at Υi,rk Oers at Υ
i,r
k




































































For the above representation of bids and oers in the markets for commodity k, the prevailing
market-clearing prices are pi,rk = 2, and p
j,r
k = (4/3), r ∈ N.
For commodity l, at posts Υi,rl and Υ
j,r
l , r ∈ N:
Bids at Υi,rl Oers at Υ
i,r
l







































































For the above representation of bids and oers in the markets for commodity l, the prevailing
market-clearing prices are pi,rl = 3, and p
j,r
l = (11/3), r ∈ N.
It is also interesting to note that for both k and l, the LOP would still fail if instead of
1
2r−1
, r ∈ N, we multiplied every b and q by 1
πr−1
, r ∈ N, where π ∈ (1,∞).
Each agent ends up with consumption (xn,k, xn,l, xn,m) = (2000, 2000, 2000) , µ-a.e, n ∈ N .
Utility functions, such that the above prole of strategies constitutes an N.E, are as in Section 2.3.
4 The failure of the LOP, Part 3: The model
In this section, we look at the failure of the LOP in a context featuring: (i) an atomless continuum
of small agents; (ii) innitely many atoms, and; (iii) innitely many markets per commodity.
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For this section, we let the set of agents be denoted by N = N0 ∪A∪C, where as before, N0 =
(0, 1] and A = {2, ..., H}, and we dene C = {H + 1, H + 2, . . .}. We let S0, SA, NN0 , NA, µ0
and µA be dened as in Section 2, and we dene SC = P (C). Trivially, SC is a σ-algebra. So, let





Then, as in the previous sections, the triple (N,N , µ) is a complete, nite measure space of agents
(see Appendix, Lemma 7). There are nitely many commodities k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . , L}, and
each large post owner is endowed with innitely many posts for each commodity, the capacity of
each post being equal to µ(N). To keep notation tractable, we choose to let post owners lie in A
only.21 The commodity space is RL+1, and the consumption set of every individual is RL+1+ . Let
the product vector space Y be dened as in Section 3, and consider Θ := `1+ × `1+. The strategy
sets of agents are described by a measurable correspondence S : N ⇒ 2Θ, such that
S(n) =
{












qs,rk (n) ≤ ek (n) , k ∈ K
}
,











, and |P | is the number of post owners in A.
A strategy prole consists of a pair of measurable mappings b : N → `1+, and q : N → `1+, such
that (b(n), q(n)) ∈ S(n) a.e in N . By the same argument as in the preceding section, we have that
the µ-measurable mappings b and q exist, by AMST. Since (N,N , µ) as dened in this section is
still a nite measure space, it easily follows that
´
N
‖b‖`1 dµ <∞ and
´
N
‖q‖`1 dµ <∞, such that
b and q are Bochner-integrable. As in the previous section, b and q are also weakly measurable, such











, where bs,rk , q
s,r
k : N×R+ ⊃ N → R+,
are measurable. For a given strategy prole (b, q) ∈ Gr(S), we then dene, for each k ∈ N,
s ∈ {1, 2, . . . |P |}, and r ∈ N, Bs,rk =
´
N





qs,rk (n)dµ <∞. Transactions





Consumption assignments for k = m, 1, . . . , L, to pure traders µ-a.e, h ∈ N , are dened as
in (4), while for any (large) post owner i ∈ A, the allocation rule is as in (5). As before, the








21We could, with no major technical diculty, let post owners lie in A∪C. However, this comes at the cost of an
even more cumbersome notation, with no signicant gain in intuition, and no change whatsoever in our conclusions.
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At an N.E with positive bids and oers, agents are viewed as solving the same problem as in
(3).
PROPOSITION 3 The results in Propositions 1.1 through to 2 and Theorem 1, are true for this
section as well, mutatis mutandis.
PROOF: The proof is identical to that of Proposition 2, and is therefore omitted. 2
4.1 Unequal-price equilibrium: an example
We show the failure of the LOP in a framework featuring: (i) an atomless continuum of small
agents; (ii) innitely many atoms, and; (iii) innitely many markets per commodity.
Let (N,N , µ) be a measure space of agents as dened in Section 4 above. Consider an economy
where N = N0 ∪ A ∪ C, N0 = (0, 1], A = {2, 3}, and C = {4, 5, . . .}, where agents 2 and 3 are
a large post owner and a large pure trader, respectively. We denote agent 2 by i, agent 3 by τ ,
and the agents in C by 3 + g, g ∈ N. The set of commodities is K = {1, 2, . . . , 10}, and i owns
innitely many markets for each commodity. The capacity of each post is µ(N) = 4. The service
charges allocated to i for commodities a ∈ KO = {1, 3, 5, 7, 9} and b ∈ KE = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10} are:





The commodity endowments of the agents are as follows:22
∀a ∈ KO ∀b ∈ KE m




















































Consider rst a pair of commodities a ∈ KO and b ∈ KE. It can be veried that the strategies
below satisfy the conditions as in Theorem 1 and Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, mutatis mutandis,23
22For clarity of exposition, the numbers in this example have been rounded o. The exact gures (rational
numbers), which were used in all computations throughout this example, are available from the author.
23There is now only one post owner i. So, at an equilibrium with positive bids and oers, and no binding liquidity
and oer constraints, the prices for any k ∈ K between any two trading posts Υi,αk ,Υ
i,β
k , α, β ∈ N, should satisfy
the following (no-arbitrage) condition for i:
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and therefore constitute an (unequal-price) N.E:
For any commodity a ∈ KO, at posts Υi,2g−1a and Υi,2ga , g ∈ N:
Agent Bids at Υi,2g−1a Oers at Υ
i,2g−1
a




















































































For the above representation of bids and oers in the markets for commodity a, the prevailing
market-clearing prices are pi,2g−1a = 12.08, and p
i,2g
a = 18.13, g ∈ N.
For any commodity b ∈ KE, at posts Υi,2g−1b and Υ
i,2g
b , g ∈ N:
Agent Bids at Υi,2g−1b Oers at Υ
i,2g−1
b




















































































For the above representation of bids and oers in the markets for commodity b, the prevailing
market-clearing prices are pi,2g−1b = 14.09, and p
i,2g
b = 17.22, g ∈ N.
Certainly, the same can be done for every other pair of commodities c ∈ KO \ {a} and d ∈
KE \ {b}. In this light, the nal consumption of all agents µ-a.e, n ∈ N , is (xn,a, xn,b, xn,m) =
(2000/2a−1, 2000/2b−2, 2000), ∀a ∈ KO, ∀b ∈ KE. From here, one can follow Koutsougeras (1999)
to derive utility functions such that the above strategies form an N.E.
Before we close this section, we highlight a few striking features of this example. First, as in
the examples in Subsections 2.3 and 3.1, equal-price equilibria can also be easily constructed for






























This result follows as a simple corollary of Proposition 1.2, and is readily seen from (6) in the proof of Proposition
1.2. Proposition 1.1 still holds, with the only dierence being that posts are now also indexed by α, β ∈ N.
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at all posts for a commodity k ∈ K, and yet, the LOP still fails across innitely many posts, all
owned by the same agent.24 It is also interesting to note that ∀a ∈ KO, and ∀b ∈ KE, we have
that
∣∣pi,2g−1a − pi,2ga ∣∣ > ∣∣pi,2g−1b − pi,2gb ∣∣ > ∣∣pi,rk − pj,rk ∣∣ = ∣∣pi,rl − pj,rl ∣∣, g, r ∈ N, where pik, pjk, pil and pjl
are as in Subsections 2.3 and 3.1. In other words, increasing the number of atoms denumerably
has, intriguingly, not decreased the degree of price dispersion. There is thus no convergence of
any kind to no-arbitrage equilibria, and denitely not to Walrasian (price-taking) equilibria. The
main message of this example (and of this paper, as a matter of fact) is that it is not who owns
the trading posts that matters, nor how many posts one ownsnitely or innitely many. What
truly counts is merely that posts be privately owned, such that service charges are imposed, for
strategic behaviour to inuence the resulting equilibrium market structure.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a framework in which strategic behaviour by agents, and private
ownership of trading posts, aect the set of equilibria of large economies non-trivially. Indeed,
while Koutsougeras (2003a) shows that the structure of trading posts becomes immaterial as the
number of agents increases without bounds, this is not true for our model. This is evidenced by the
failure of the LOP even in economies with many agents and markets. Thus, we can conclude that
in large frictionless (in the sense that no money and/or commodity leaves the system or is lost)
SMG, it is strategic behaviour, alongside the private ownership of trading posts, that constitutes
the only source of equilibria with arbitrage.
In light of the above, we believe that the model proposed in this paper can be easily applied
to other elds of study, to provide a theoretical underpinning for the failure of the LOP that
is based on strategic behaviour by agents. In particular, elds such as dierential-information,
international, macro-, and even public economics25 would be suitable avenues, for these are areas
24The presence of only one post owner does not weaken our conclusions in any way; if anything, it strengthens
them. This is because at a glance, it would seem that this post owner would have the strongest incentives to shift
his orders across posts (all of which he owns) in a way such that the aggregate net trade across the markets remains
unchanged. However, this unilateral deviation will not be protable for himsee, for instance, Koutsougeras
(2003b) and Toraubally (2017b).
25The interested reader is referred to Goenka et al. (1998) for a pioneering and rigorous application of SMG to
macroeconomics. For an application of SMG to dierential-information economics, see, e.g., Faias et al. (2010).
For a recent application of SMG to international trade, see, e.g., Toraubally (2017b). For the use of the SMG
19
in which there are, not only large numbers of agents and markets, but also many well-documented
cases of inconsistent prices. In future research, given the crucial role that the trading-post service
charges play in this model, it would be worthwhile to analyse in greater detail how changes in
those charges aect the behaviour of net buyers and net sellers, and in particular, the direction of
trade.
Appendix
LEMMA 1 The set function ν : S → [0,∞], where S = {W ⊆ N : W = K ∪ L;K ∈ S0;L ∈ SA},
such that ν(W ) = ν0 (W ∩N0) + µA (W ∩ A) for each W ∈ S , is a measure.
PROOF: It can be easily shown, given S0 and SA are semirings, that S is also a semiring. So,
for each countable family {Wn}n∈N of pairwise disjoint sets in S , with
⋃∞

















n=1 (Wn ∩N0)) + µA (
⋃∞




ν0 (Wn ∩N0) +
∑∞
n=1








So ν is σ-additive. Finally, by construction, we have that ν(∅) = ν0 (∅) + µA (∅) = 0. 2
Since ν is a measure on S , it generates a nonnegative extended real-valued set function µ, the
Carathéodory extension of ν, dened on P(N). µ is, as is well known, an outer measure. So,
a set W ⊆ N is said to be µ-measurable if µ(Y ) = µ(Y ∩W ) + µ (Y ∩W c), for each Y ⊆ N .
Next, denote by N the collection of all the µ-measurable subsets of N . Thus, we have that N is
a σ-algebra, and µ is a complete measure (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006: p. 387) when
restricted to N . We then have that:
LEMMA 2 The triple (N,N , µ) is a complete, nite measure space of agents. Moreover, µ is the
unique extension of ν to a measure on N .
PROOF: Since µ(N) = H <∞, we have that the measure space (N,N , µ) is nite. This implies
that the measure ν on S is also nite, and therefore, σ-nite. Since N is a semiring with S ⊆ N ,
mechanism in public economics, see, e.g., Faias et al. (2014).
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our result follows (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006: pp. 382-383). 2
Consider now the set function ν0 : S0 → [0,∞]. Since ν0 is a measure on S0, it also generates
a nonnegative extended real-valued set function µ0, the Carathéodory extension of ν0, dened on
P(N0). Denote by N0 the collection of all the µ0-measurable subsets of N0. Then, we have that
N0 is a σ-algebra, and µ0 is a measure when restricted to N0. Thus, the triple (N0,N0, µ0) is
a complete, nite measure space, and µ0 is the unique extension of ν0 to a measure on N0. Let
NN0 = {N0 ∩W : W ∈ N} denote the restriction of N to N0. We then have the following result.




is a measure space such that NN0 = N0, and µ = µ0 when
restricted to NN0 .
PROOF:We rst prove the second part of our lemma, which involves appropriately manipulating,
for every W in N0, the following formula for µ, the Carathéodory extension of ν, thus:
µ (W ) = inf
{∑∞






















= µ0 (W ) .
Now, since N0 is µ-measurable, NN0 is then, by denition, a collection of µ-measurable subsets of
N0. So, let W ∈ N0, and consider any Y ⊆ N . By the σ-subadditivity of µ, and given µ(∅) = 0,
we have





































Since µ = µ0 for every W ⊆ N0, and using the µ0-measurability of W , we may show that
µ
(






































= µ (Y ) .
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This implies that µ (Y ∩W )+µ (Y ∩W c) = µ(Y ), which then implies thatW is also µ-measurable,
thereby showing that N0 ⊆ NN0 . To show the reverse inclusion, we rst let W ∈ NN0 , then use
the µ-measurability of W , and subsequently, the σ-additivity of µ on N , to show that W is also
µ0-measurable, such that the result that NN0 ⊆ N0 easily follows. Thus, we have N0 = NN0 . 2




. Since SA is the collection of all the µA-measurable subsets





measure space. Let NA = {A ∩W : W ∈ N} denote the restriction of N to A. The following fact
characterises the restriction of the measure space (N,N , µ) to A.




is a measure space such that NA = SA, and µ = µA when
restricted to NA.
PROOF: The result that µ = µA when restricted to NA can be easily obtained by using a
similar line of reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3. To prove that NA = SA, note that because
SA := P (A), we only need to show that SA ⊆ NA, which is trivial, since SA ⊂ S ⊆ N ⇒ SA =
{A ∩ L : L ∈ S } ⊆ {A ∩W : W ∈ N} = NA. 2









is purely atomic. Moreover, for each i ∈ A, the
singleton set {i} is an atom of the measure space (N,N , µ).
The following lemma shows that the set of all feasible net trades is convex. We will use this result
in the proofs of Propositions 1.1, 1.2, and 2.
LEMMA 5 For each n ∈ N , the set of all feasible net trades is convex.
PROOF: To avoid repetition and to save space, we prove the result for when there are countably
many trading posts per commodity. This way, the result automatically holds true for all of the
constructions in Sections 2 through to 4. For ease of exposition, we will adopt a dierent notation
to the one that has been used thus far for the purposes of the rst part of the proof only.
So, let Zn denote the set of all feasible net trades for some n ∈ N . Let z̃n and ẑn ∈ Zn, where z̃n
and ẑn are obtained by the vectors of strategies (b̃n, q̃n) and (b̂n, q̂n), respectively, i.e., z̃n := z(b̃n, q̃n)
and ẑn := z(b̂n, q̂n). We need to show that, given the strategies of all the other agents, for any
22
λ ∈ [0, 1], λz̃n+(1− λ) ẑn ∈ Zn. In other words, if
?











zn. So, rst, x a λ ∈ [0, 1]. Now, we may rewrite z̃n and ẑn
explicitly as z̃n =
(
z̃n,m, z̃n,1, . . . , z̃n,k, . . . , z̃n,L
)T
, and ẑn =
(
ẑn,m, ẑn,1, . . . , ẑn,k, . . . , ẑn,L
)T
, where








ẑn,m, ẑn,1, . . . , ẑn,L
)T
=(
λz̃n,m + (1− λ) ẑn,m, λz̃n,1 + (1− λ) ẑn,1, . . . , λz̃n,L + (1− λ) ẑn,L
)T ≡ (?zn,m, ?zn,1, . . . , ?zn,L)T . But

















































zn,k. Here, Γ ≤ ∞ denotes the
number of posts that an agent s ∈ A owns, and |P | is the number of post owners in A. So, our
strategy will be to proceed post by post, and show that each
?
zs,rn,k, s ∈ {1, . . . , |P |}, r ∈ {1, . . . , Γ},
is feasible, such that
?
zn,k has to be feasible. One can then repeat the algorithm for every other
commodity l ∈ K \ {k}.
With these preliminary remarks out of the way, consider a commodity k ∈ K, any one trading




















































































≤ λz̃i,rn,k + (1− λ) ẑ
i,r
n,k
≤ ?zi,rn,k = λz̃
i,r
n,k + (1− λ) ẑ
i,r
n,k


























n,k constant), while z
i,r
n,k is continuous and decreas-
ing in qi,rn,k (holding b
i,r



































































Notice that the above procedure can now be repeated for each post Υs,rk , s ∈ {1, . . . , |P |},
r ∈ {1, . . . , Γ}, such that ?zn,k is budget-feasible. Certainly, the same can also be done for all
commodities k ∈ K to get ?zn feasible. Hence, the set of all budget-feasible net trades in commodi-
ties k ∈ K is convex. Denote this set by ZK .

















































zs,rk (τ) · µ(τ)−Q
s,r
−τ,k
) · (1 + ts,r,kτ ck),



















































zs,rk (i) · µ(i)−Q
s,r
−i,k
) · (1 + ts,r,ki ck),
where, as in the main body of the paper, ϕs,rk (n), ϕ = b, q, denotes the strategies of agent n ∈ N
at the rth post owned by s ∈ A for commodity k. Now, over the convex set ZK , it can be veried
that zm(w), being the sum of countably many concave functions is concave, while zm(τ) and zm(i),
being the sum of countably many strictly concave functions, are both strictly concave functions.
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Given that the hypograph of a concave function is a convex set, we nally have that for every
agent µ-a.e, n ∈ N , the set of all feasible net trade bundles, Zn, is indeed convex. 2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.1: The Lagrangian to the programme in (3) for large pure
traders τ ∈ N \N0 can be written as



















where x = (xτ,m, xτ,1, . . . , xτ,L), and λ
b and {λqk}Lk=1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the constraints in (3). Next, consider any post Υik, for any k ∈ K. Solving for the rst-order




























)2 · (1 + ti,kτ ck) = 0.

















Now, consider another post for commodity k, say Υjk. Then, by the same argument as above, at

















The conclusion for large pure traders τ ∈ N \N0 is implied by the last two equations above.
Next, consider small pure traders and post owners in N0. Since by construction χ
small = 0,
one may view all agents in N0 as being small pure traders. So, it is easy to see that since N0



















k, s = i, j. Hence, µ-a.e, w ∈ N0, it has to be
true that
27By construction, xk : zk → ek +zk, ∀k ∈ ({m}∪K). So, dene a new function v = u◦x : RL+1 ⊃ z → R. u is a
smooth strictly concave function of x; trivially therefore, v is a smooth strictly concave function of z. By Lemma 5,
we have that the set of all feasible/attainable net trades is convex. Hence, by the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem,
a unique optimum exists, i.e., there is a unique net trade bundle that is a best response to the strategies played
by other agents.
28To simplify exposition, we make use of the fact that zik(n) · (∂ti,kn /∂zik(n)) · (∂zik(n)/∂bik(n)) = zik(n) ·
(∂ti,kn /∂z
i

















1 + ti,kw ck
)(pjk)2 ⇔ pik = (1 + tj,kw ck)(
1 + ti,kw ck
) pjk . 2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2: The Lagrangian to the programme in (3) for large post
owners i ∈ A (for whom µ(i) = 1) can be written as





























































































Consider now another post for k, owned by some other large agent j ∈ A\{i}. Then, at an interior















































The condition for i ∈ A is implied by equations (6) and (7) above. The condition for j ∈ A \ {i}
can be obtained by following an argument analogous to the one above. 2
LEMMA 6 The distribution rules, as dened in Section 3, are Gâteaux-dierentiable.
PROOF: Let a strategy prole (b, q) ∈ Gr(S) be given. We rst prove that xn,k, k 6= m, is
Gâteaux-dierentiable at (b, q).
26
Gâteaux-dierentiability of xn,k, k 6= m:























∥∥ĥb∥∥`1 = 1. We
dene the terms hq, ĥq and ĥ
s,r,k
n,q analogously. Next, let `
1



















, where each b̂s,rk (n) =
bs,rk (n)
‖b‖`1
. q(n) and q̂(n) are dened

























k (n) ≤ ek(n), k ∈ K
}
. We may now proceed.
Using the denition of the Gâteaux dierential as in Luenberger (1969: p. 171) and taking limits,


















where ĥs,r,kn,b and ĥ
s,r,k
n,q are the increments associated with b
s,r
k (n) and q
s,r
k (n), respectively. Clearly,
δxn,k((b, q), h) is linear in its increments hb and hq. We need to prove that −∞ < δxn,k((b, q), h) <





















ek(n)dµ < ∞ ∀k ∈ ({m} ∪K), we have that
´
N
xn,kdµ < ∞. So, bearing in mind that









is nite a.e in N . Now, since ĥb is normalised, we may choose some
¯̂
b(n) ∈ B̂k(n), such that
ĥs,r,kn,b =
¯̂














· ¯̂bs,rk (n) <∞.




























∈ `1+. Combining these two results yields −∞ < δxn,k((b, q), h) <∞.
Finally, note that ĥb, ĥq ∈ `1+ were arbitrarily chosen. Hence, xn,k is indeed Gâteaux-dierentiable.
Gâteaux-dierentiability of xn,k, k = m:
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We now prove that xi,m for some post owner i ∈ A (such that µ(i) = 1) is Gâteaux-dierentiable
at (b, q). That xn,m, µ-a.e, n ∈ N \ {i}, is also Gâteaux-dierentiable at (b, q) then follows as a






























































where as before, both sequences of increments have been normalised. Clearly, δxi,m((b, q), h) is also
linear in its increments hb and hq. For ease of exposition, let the summation in the rst row in the
expression just above be represented by W , and the summation in the second row by Y . We rst





















1 + ts,r,ki c
k
)






































































































































∞, we have that
´
N










is nite for any q̂(i) ∈ Q̂(i). Since ĥq is normalised, we may therefore
pick some ¯̂q(i) ∈ Q̂(i), such that ĥs,r,ki,q = ¯̂q
s,r
k (i) for each s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |P |}, r ∈ N, and each
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· ĥi,r,ki,q is also
nite. Hence, −∞ < Y < ∞, such that −∞ < δxi,m((b, q), h) < ∞. Finally, recall that in this
part of our proof as well, ĥb, ĥq ∈ `1+ were arbitrarily chosen. Hence, xi,m is Gâteaux-dierentiable.
That xn,m, µ-a.e, n ∈ N \ {i}, is also Gâteaux-dierentiable at (b, q), follows as a corollary. 2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Let the positive bids and oers of all agents other than
some n ∈ N be given. By Assumption (ii), u(·) is strictly concave in x. Dene a new mapping
v = u ◦ x : RL+1 ⊃ Zn 3 z(n)→ R, where x : RL+1 ⊃ Zn 3 z(n)→ RL+1+ , and Zn is agent n's set
of all feasible net trades, which by Lemma 5 is convex. Trivially therefore, v(·) is strictly concave.
So, at an interior equilibrium, each agent µ-a.e, n ∈ N , solves infz(n)∈Zn{−v (·)}. Since −v(·) is
strictly convex, if this problem has a solution, then it is unique. We may therefore move back to
strategy space to derive the rst-order necessary and sucient conditions. This will be achieved
by using a Generalised KuhnTucker theorem (GKTT) as in Luenberger (1969: p. 249). Thus,
we need to show that all of the conditions of that theorem hold for our construction in Section 3.
To help the reader, we relate each piece of notation from the GKTT to the symbols that we use
in our model. In particular, X will now be represented by Y (for conciseness, X ≡ Y ), Z ≡ RL+1,
P ≡ RL+1+ , f ≡ −ζ, G ≡ G, x0 ≡ s, z∗0 ≡ ψ∗, and Z∗ ≡ RL+1.
We proceed by noting that Y := `1 × `1 (equipped with the norm ‖·‖Y = ‖·‖`1 + ‖·‖`1 , as
dened in Section 3), is a normed vector space, and so is RL+1 (endowed with its usual Euclidean
norm), whose positive cone RL+1+ contains an interior point. By Assumption (ii), u(·) is Fréchet-
dierentiable in x. By Lemma 6, x(·) is Gâteaux-dierentiable in b and q, and is linear in its
increments (hb and hq). Thus, ζ := u ◦ x : Y ⊃ `1+ × `1+ 3 (b, q) → R, is a Gâteaux-dierentiable
functional possessing linear increments, and hence, so is −ζ(·). Let G(·) be a mapping G : Y ⊃









































. In this regard,
it can be easily shown that G(·) is a Gâteaux-dierentiable mapping with linear increments (see
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Luenberger, 1969: p. 171, and, e.g., Lemma 6). Next, suppose that the strategy s(n) := (b(n), q(n))
minimises −ζ(·) subject to G(s(n)) ≤ 0, where 0 is a null vector. We need to show that s(n) is
a regular point (see Luenberger, 1969: p. 248). This is straightforward. Choose an increment
h = h(ε) ∈ Y (see Luenberger, 1969: pp. 171-172) such that for a given and suciently small














































































where the rst, second, and third matrices correspond to G(s(n)), δG(s(n);h) := G
′
(s(n)) · h,
and 0, respectively, with G
′
(s(n)) denoting the Gâteaux derivative of G(·) at s(n). Note that









k )] > 0. So, it is easy to see, by
considering one row at a time, that each sum above is strictly negative, whether the constraints
are binding or not. Hence, s(n) is a regular point, i.e., G(s(n)) ≤ 0, and ∃h ∈ Y , such that
G(s(n)) + δG(s(n);h) < 0.
Since all the conditions of the GKTT are met, we have, at an N.E with positive bids and oers,












































− ψ∗q,k = 0, k ∈ K;
ψ∗ ·G(s(n)) = 0.
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, for Section 3, mutatis mutandis, can be easily derived by plugging into the
above system of equations the respective allocation rules for each type of agentsand by noting
that at an N.E with positive bids and oers, and no binding liquidity and oer contraints, ψ∗ = 0.
The corresponding version of Theorem 1 can be subsequently retrieved. 2
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LEMMA 7 The set function ν : S → [0,∞], where S =
{
W ⊆ N : W = K ∪ L ∪M ;K ∈
S0;L ∈ SA;M ∈ SC
}




+ µA (W ∩ A) + µC (W ∩ C) for each
W ∈ S , is a measure. Moreover, the triple (N,N , µ)where N is the collection of all the µ-
measurable subsets of N , and µ is the unique extension of ν to a measure on Nis a complete,
nite measure space of agents.
PROOF: The rst part of the lemma is easily proved by following the workings in Lemma 1.
Now, since ν is a measure on S , it generates a nonnegative extended real-valued set function µ,
the Carathéodory extension of ν, dened on P(N). In this regard, note that µ(N) = H + 1 <∞,
such that the measure space (N,N , µ) is nite (and complete). This implies that the measure ν on
S is also nite, and therefore, σ-nite. Since N is a semiring with S ⊆ N , our result follows. 2
Remark. The other properties of the new measure µ, together with those of the measure spaces
(N0,NN0 , µ), (A,NA, µ), and (C,NC , µ), where NC denotes the restriction of N to C, can be
derived by following the workings in Lemmata 3 and 4.
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